Public interest test. / Stefan Zehle in Intermedia, 43/1 (March 2015)

Public ISBD [article]  inIntermedia > 43/1 (March 2015) . - p.29-32 Titre : Public interest test. Type de document : document électronique Auteurs : Stefan Zehle, Auteur Année de publication : 2015 Article en page(s) : p.29-32 Langues : Anglais Catégories : MEDIAS:AUDIOVISUEL:NUMERIQUE: Aspect économique MEDIAS:AUDIOVISUEL:NUMERIQUE:Réseaux et infrastructures Tags : télécommunications  opérateurs  régulation  concurrence Index. décimale : 621.382 Télécommunications Résumé : Page 29 : "Continuing our coverage of spectrum auctions, Stefan Zehle explores further the pitfalls and implications for the public purse, drawing on key examples from the past decade." (Chapeau de l'article) "Allocating spectrum to mobile operators by auction is the mechanism preferred by most regulators, and allows a scarce resource to be assigned to those who value it the most, so helping to identify the highest value use and users. However, much depends on the auction format and auction rules, which are usually designed to deliver policy objectives, but there are aspects of these formats and rules that present a high risks of adverse consequences, as they distort spectrum auctions. The common distortions are : - The use of set-asides or spectrum caps - Excessively high reserve prices and licence payment terms - A choice of auction format that does not suit the market conditions in a particular country. (...)" [article] Public interest test. [document électronique] / Stefan Zehle, Auteur . - 2015 . - p.29-32. Langues : Anglais in Intermedia > 43/1 (March 2015) . - p.29-32 Catégories : MEDIAS:AUDIOVISUEL:NUMERIQUE: Aspect économique MEDIAS:AUDIOVISUEL:NUMERIQUE:Réseaux et infrastructures Tags : télécommunications  opérateurs  régulation  concurrence Index. décimale : 621.382 Télécommunications Résumé : Page 29 : "Continuing our coverage of spectrum auctions, Stefan Zehle explores further the pitfalls and implications for the public purse, drawing on key examples from the past decade." (Chapeau de l'article) "Allocating spectrum to mobile operators by auction is the mechanism preferred by most regulators, and allows a scarce resource to be assigned to those who value it the most, so helping to identify the highest value use and users. However, much depends on the auction format and auction rules, which are usually designed to deliver policy objectives, but there are aspects of these formats and rules that present a high risks of adverse consequences, as they distort spectrum auctions. The common distortions are : - The use of set-asides or spectrum caps - Excessively high reserve prices and licence payment terms - A choice of auction format that does not suit the market conditions in a particular country. (...)"

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