[article] | Titre : | Public interest test. | | Type de document : | document électronique | | Auteurs : | Stefan Zehle, Auteur | | Année de publication : | 2015 | | Article en page(s) : | p.29-32 | | Langues : | Anglais | | Catégories : | MEDIAS:AUDIOVISUEL:NUMERIQUE: Aspect économique
MEDIAS:AUDIOVISUEL:NUMERIQUE:Réseaux et infrastructures
| | Tags : | télécommunications opérateurs régulation concurrence | | Index. décimale : | 621.382 Télécommunications | | Résumé : | Page 29 :
"Continuing our coverage of spectrum auctions, Stefan Zehle explores further the pitfalls and implications for the public purse, drawing on key examples from the past decade." (Chapeau de l'article)
"Allocating spectrum to mobile operators by auction is the mechanism preferred by most regulators, and allows a scarce resource to be assigned to those who value it the most, so helping to identify the highest value use and users. However, much depends on the auction format and auction rules, which are usually designed to deliver policy objectives, but there are aspects of these formats and rules that present a high risks of adverse consequences, as they distort spectrum auctions.
The common distortions are :
- The use of set-asides or spectrum caps
- Excessively high reserve prices and licence payment terms
- A choice of auction format that does not suit the market conditions in a particular country. (...)"
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in Intermedia > 43/1 (March 2015) . - p.29-32
[article] Public interest test. [document électronique] / Stefan Zehle, Auteur . - 2015 . - p.29-32. Langues : Anglais in Intermedia > 43/1 (March 2015) . - p.29-32 | Catégories : | MEDIAS:AUDIOVISUEL:NUMERIQUE: Aspect économique
MEDIAS:AUDIOVISUEL:NUMERIQUE:Réseaux et infrastructures
| | Tags : | télécommunications opérateurs régulation concurrence | | Index. décimale : | 621.382 Télécommunications | | Résumé : | Page 29 :
"Continuing our coverage of spectrum auctions, Stefan Zehle explores further the pitfalls and implications for the public purse, drawing on key examples from the past decade." (Chapeau de l'article)
"Allocating spectrum to mobile operators by auction is the mechanism preferred by most regulators, and allows a scarce resource to be assigned to those who value it the most, so helping to identify the highest value use and users. However, much depends on the auction format and auction rules, which are usually designed to deliver policy objectives, but there are aspects of these formats and rules that present a high risks of adverse consequences, as they distort spectrum auctions.
The common distortions are :
- The use of set-asides or spectrum caps
- Excessively high reserve prices and licence payment terms
- A choice of auction format that does not suit the market conditions in a particular country. (...)"
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Accueil
Public interest test. in Intermedia, 43/1 (March 2015)