De facto independence after delegation : A fuzzy-set analysis / Martino Maggetti 

Public ISBD Titre : De facto independence after delegation : A fuzzy-set analysis Type de document : document électronique Auteurs : Martino Maggetti, Auteur Editeur : Regulation & Governance Année de publication : 2007 Importance : Volume 1, Issue 4, p. 271–294, 24 p. Langues : Anglais Catégories : DOCUMENTATION ORGANES DE REGULATION (SAUF CSA BELGE) Tags : indépendance  régulation  politique  service public Index. décimale : 342.06 Droit administratif Résumé : "The phenomenon of delegating public authority from elected politicians (or ministries headed by elected politicians) to formally independent regulatory agencies (RAs) is becoming increasingly widespread. This paper examines the relation between formal independence, as prescribed in the constitutions of agencies, and de facto independence. Toward this end, it conceptualizes and assesses de facto independence of RAs, and discusses organizational, institutional, and political explanations for divergence from formal independence. The complex relations between de facto and formal independence are examined with a cross-national, cross-sectoral comparison of 16 Western European RAs using fuzzy-set analysis. The results show that formal independence is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for explaining variations in the de facto independence of agencies. Other factors, such as the lifecycle of agencies, veto players, and European networks of agencies, have a decisive impact" Source : http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1748-5991.2007.00023.x/abstract (consulté le 06/03/2013) En ligne : http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1748-5991.2007.00023.x/pdf De facto independence after delegation : A fuzzy-set analysis [document électronique] / Martino Maggetti, Auteur . - [S.l.] : Regulation & Governance, 2007 . - Volume 1, Issue 4, p. 271–294, 24 p. Langues : Anglais Catégories : DOCUMENTATION ORGANES DE REGULATION (SAUF CSA BELGE) Tags : indépendance  régulation  politique  service public Index. décimale : 342.06 Droit administratif Résumé : "The phenomenon of delegating public authority from elected politicians (or ministries headed by elected politicians) to formally independent regulatory agencies (RAs) is becoming increasingly widespread. This paper examines the relation between formal independence, as prescribed in the constitutions of agencies, and de facto independence. Toward this end, it conceptualizes and assesses de facto independence of RAs, and discusses organizational, institutional, and political explanations for divergence from formal independence. The complex relations between de facto and formal independence are examined with a cross-national, cross-sectoral comparison of 16 Western European RAs using fuzzy-set analysis. The results show that formal independence is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for explaining variations in the de facto independence of agencies. Other factors, such as the lifecycle of agencies, veto players, and European networks of agencies, have a decisive impact" Source : http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1748-5991.2007.00023.x/abstract (consulté le 06/03/2013) En ligne : http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1748-5991.2007.00023.x/pdf

The role of independent regulatory agencies in policy-making : a comparative analysis / Martino Maggetti

Public ISBD Titre : The role of independent regulatory agencies in policy-making : a comparative analysis Type de document : document électronique Auteurs : Martino Maggetti, Auteur Editeur : Journal of European Public Policy Année de publication : 2009 Importance : Volume 16, Issue 3, p. 450-470, 20 p. Langues : Anglais Catégories : DOCUMENTATION ORGANES DE REGULATION (SAUF CSA BELGE) Tags : régulation  politique  indépendance  Europe  administration Index. décimale : 342.06 Droit administratif Résumé : "This article examines the role of formally independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) in policy-making, focusing on six cases concerning the revision of crucial laws related to the competencies of the investigated IRA. These cases were selected from three small European countries (the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland) and two policy areas (finance and competition). After collecting documental and survey information on the participation and weight of each actor, the Actor-Process-Event Scheme was used to obtain a synthetic measure of agencies’ centrality in the course of each policy process. My hypotheses on the centrality of agencies are then tested with a two-step Qualitative Comparative Analysis. Results suggest that de facto independence from the political decision-makers is a necessary condition for the maximal centrality of agencies in policy-making, whilst non-professionalization of the legislature and low independence from the regulatees are jointly sufficient for explaining this outcome." Source : http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13501760802662854 (consulté le 05/03/2013) The role of independent regulatory agencies in policy-making : a comparative analysis [document électronique] / Martino Maggetti, Auteur . - [S.l.] : Journal of European Public Policy, 2009 . - Volume 16, Issue 3, p. 450-470, 20 p. Langues : Anglais Catégories : DOCUMENTATION ORGANES DE REGULATION (SAUF CSA BELGE) Tags : régulation  politique  indépendance  Europe  administration Index. décimale : 342.06 Droit administratif Résumé : "This article examines the role of formally independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) in policy-making, focusing on six cases concerning the revision of crucial laws related to the competencies of the investigated IRA. These cases were selected from three small European countries (the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland) and two policy areas (finance and competition). After collecting documental and survey information on the participation and weight of each actor, the Actor-Process-Event Scheme was used to obtain a synthetic measure of agencies’ centrality in the course of each policy process. My hypotheses on the centrality of agencies are then tested with a two-step Qualitative Comparative Analysis. Results suggest that de facto independence from the political decision-makers is a necessary condition for the maximal centrality of agencies in policy-making, whilst non-professionalization of the legislature and low independence from the regulatees are jointly sufficient for explaining this outcome." Source : http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13501760802662854 (consulté le 05/03/2013)

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