The self-restraining state - Power and accountability in new democracies / Andreas Schedler 

Public ISBD Titre : The self-restraining state - Power and accountability in new democracies Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Andreas Schedler, Editeur scientifique ; Larry Diamond, Editeur scientifique ; Marc F. Plattner, Editeur scientifique Editeur : Boulder [USA] : Lynne Rienner Année de publication : 1999 Importance : x-393 p. Format : 21,5 cm Prix : 33,-€ Langues : Anglais Catégories : AUTRES Tags : gouvernance  démocratie  politique  administration  élections  justice  financement Index. décimale : 350 Administration publique Résumé : Présentation de l'éditeur : "New democracies all over the world are finding themselves haunted by the old demons of clientelism, corruption, arbitrariness, and the abuse of power—leading to a growing awareness that, in addition to elections, democracy requires checks and balances. Democratic governments must be accountable to the electorate; but they must also be subject to restraint and oversight by other public agencies. It is not enough that citizens control the state. The state must control itself. This collection explores how new democracies can achieve that goal. Focusing on electoral administration, judicial systems, corruption control, and central banks, the authors consider such issues as how governments can establish effective agencies of restraint, why they should accept them, and what those agencies can do to achieve credibility." (Source : http://www.rienner.com - Consulté le 06/08/2010) Note de contenu : Introduction PART 1 - CONCEPTUAL AND NORMATIVE ISSUES. Conceptualizing Accountability Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies Comments on O'Donnell. - Constitutionalism and Democracy - The Limits of Horizontal Accountability - Traditions of Accountability - A Response to My Commentators PART 2 - ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATION. A Brief History of Electoral Administration Off the Streets and into the Courtrooms: Resolving Postelectoral Conflicts in Mexico Institutionalizing Credible Elections in Ghana The Third Dimension of Accountability: The International Community in National Elections PART 3 - JUDICIAL SYSTEMS. A Brief History of Judicial Review Judicial Independence and Judicial Reform in Latin America Building Judicial Independence in Common Law Africa Surprising Success: The New East European Constitutional Courts PART 4 - CORRUPTION CONTROL. A Brief History of Anticorruption Agencies Corruption, Democracy, and Reform in Benin Combating Corruption in Asia: South Korea and Thailand The Global Coalition Against Corruption: Evaluating Transparency International PART 5 - CENTRAL BANKS. A Brief History of Central Bank Independence in Developing Countries Misguided Autonomy: Central Bank Independence in the Russian Transition Learning From Failure: The International Financial Institutions as Agencies of Restraint in Africa PART 6 - CONCLUSION. Restraining the State: Conflicts and Agents of Accountability En ligne : http://www.rienner.com The self-restraining state - Power and accountability in new democracies [texte imprimé] / Andreas Schedler, Editeur scientifique ; Larry Diamond, Editeur scientifique ; Marc F. Plattner, Editeur scientifique . - Boulder (1800 30th St., Ste. 314, CO 80301, USA) : Lynne Rienner, 1999 . - x-393 p. ; 21,5 cm. 33,-€ Langues : Anglais Catégories : AUTRES Tags : gouvernance  démocratie  politique  administration  élections  justice  financement Index. décimale : 350 Administration publique Résumé : Présentation de l'éditeur : "New democracies all over the world are finding themselves haunted by the old demons of clientelism, corruption, arbitrariness, and the abuse of power—leading to a growing awareness that, in addition to elections, democracy requires checks and balances. Democratic governments must be accountable to the electorate; but they must also be subject to restraint and oversight by other public agencies. It is not enough that citizens control the state. The state must control itself. This collection explores how new democracies can achieve that goal. Focusing on electoral administration, judicial systems, corruption control, and central banks, the authors consider such issues as how governments can establish effective agencies of restraint, why they should accept them, and what those agencies can do to achieve credibility." (Source : http://www.rienner.com - Consulté le 06/08/2010) Note de contenu : Introduction PART 1 - CONCEPTUAL AND NORMATIVE ISSUES. Conceptualizing Accountability Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies Comments on O'Donnell. - Constitutionalism and Democracy - The Limits of Horizontal Accountability - Traditions of Accountability - A Response to My Commentators PART 2 - ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATION. A Brief History of Electoral Administration Off the Streets and into the Courtrooms: Resolving Postelectoral Conflicts in Mexico Institutionalizing Credible Elections in Ghana The Third Dimension of Accountability: The International Community in National Elections PART 3 - JUDICIAL SYSTEMS. A Brief History of Judicial Review Judicial Independence and Judicial Reform in Latin America Building Judicial Independence in Common Law Africa Surprising Success: The New East European Constitutional Courts PART 4 - CORRUPTION CONTROL. A Brief History of Anticorruption Agencies Corruption, Democracy, and Reform in Benin Combating Corruption in Asia: South Korea and Thailand The Global Coalition Against Corruption: Evaluating Transparency International PART 5 - CENTRAL BANKS. A Brief History of Central Bank Independence in Developing Countries Misguided Autonomy: Central Bank Independence in the Russian Transition Learning From Failure: The International Financial Institutions as Agencies of Restraint in Africa PART 6 - CONCLUSION. Restraining the State: Conflicts and Agents of Accountability En ligne : http://www.rienner.com

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