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The Formal Independence of Regulators : A Comparison of 17 Countries and 7 Sectors / Fabrizio Gilardi
Titre : The Formal Independence of Regulators : A Comparison of 17 Countries and 7 Sectors Type de document : document électronique Auteurs : Fabrizio Gilardi, Auteur Editeur : Swiss Political Science Review Année de publication : 2005 Importance : Volume 11, Issue 4, pages 139–167, 29 p. ISBN/ISSN/EAN : 1662-6370 Langues : Anglais Catégories : DOCUMENTATION ORGANES DE REGULATION (SAUF CSA BELGE) Tags : Administration régulation politique Index. décimale : 342.06 Droit administratif Note de contenu : "This article seeks to explain the pattern of delegation to independent regulatory agencies in Western Europe. Two types of arguments are advanced to explain variations in the formal independence of regulators. Firstly, the need for governments to increase their credible commitment capacity may lead them to delegate regulation to an agency that is partly beyond their direct control. Secondly, delegation may be a response to the political uncertainty problem, which arises when governments are afraid of being replaced by another coalition with different preferences, which could decide to change existing policy choices. In addition, veto players may constitute a functional equivalent of delegation, since they influence policy stability and therefore tend to mitigate both the credibility and the political uncertainty problems. These arguments are consistent with the results of the empirical analysis of the formal independence of regulators in seventeen countries and seven sectors."
Source : http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/j.1662-6370.2005.tb00374.x/abstract (consulté le 04/03/2013)En ligne : http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/j.1662-6370.2005.tb00374.x/abstract The Formal Independence of Regulators : A Comparison of 17 Countries and 7 Sectors [document électronique] / Fabrizio Gilardi, Auteur . - Suisse : Swiss Political Science Review, 2005 . - Volume 11, Issue 4, pages 139–167, 29 p.
ISSN : 1662-6370
Langues : Anglais
Catégories : DOCUMENTATION ORGANES DE REGULATION (SAUF CSA BELGE) Tags : Administration régulation politique Index. décimale : 342.06 Droit administratif Note de contenu : "This article seeks to explain the pattern of delegation to independent regulatory agencies in Western Europe. Two types of arguments are advanced to explain variations in the formal independence of regulators. Firstly, the need for governments to increase their credible commitment capacity may lead them to delegate regulation to an agency that is partly beyond their direct control. Secondly, delegation may be a response to the political uncertainty problem, which arises when governments are afraid of being replaced by another coalition with different preferences, which could decide to change existing policy choices. In addition, veto players may constitute a functional equivalent of delegation, since they influence policy stability and therefore tend to mitigate both the credibility and the political uncertainty problems. These arguments are consistent with the results of the empirical analysis of the formal independence of regulators in seventeen countries and seven sectors."
Source : http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/j.1662-6370.2005.tb00374.x/abstract (consulté le 04/03/2013)En ligne : http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/j.1662-6370.2005.tb00374.x/abstract